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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * *

JOHN M. McPHIE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 14364
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION and THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendan ts.
* "k

*

ACTION FOR REVIEW OF
FINAL ORDER OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
* * *

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF, JOHN M# McPHIE
Vernon B. Romney
Attorney General of Utah
263 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Defendant, The
Industrial Commission of Utah
Erie V. Boorman
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant, United
States Steel Corporation

A„ Wally Sandack
Sandack & Sandack
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Attorney for Plaintiff, John
M. McPhie

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to review a final order of
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying Plaintiff
workmen's compensation benefits under the statutory
Combined Special Injury Fund.
DISPOSITION BELOW
After a finding and award by the Commission
holding Plaintiff has a 100% permanent impairment of
his body and mind resulting from all causes and conditions, including a 15% permanent partial loss of
body function attributable to injuries sustained by
Plaintiff in an industrial accident, in the course of
employment, at Geneva Steel Plant July 23, 1972, the
Commission ruled that Plaintiff's 15% disability does
not entitle him to Combined Special Injury Fund benefits even though Plaintiff was found to be 100% permanently and totally disabled.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff filed this Writ of Review seeking
reversal of the Commission's Order and a ruling by
this Court that Plaintiff is entitled to the benefits
established by the Combined Special Injury Fund.
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] , The a p p l i c a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n s t a b i l i z e d
s u f f i c i e n t l y , so t h a t the question of permanent
p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y can be d e t e r m i n e d , s i x months
f o l l o w i n g h i s surgery,
2. The a p p l i c a n t has 100% permanent impairment of the body and the mind r e s u l t i n g
from a l l c a u s e s , including t h e injury sustained
in the a c c i d e n t of ,Ji i] y 23, 1 972, '
There I s 15% permanent I oss of body
function d i r e c t l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the acci d e n t
of J u l y 23, 1972,
4 # The remaining permanent physical impairment is attributed to previously exist!ng,
co-existing and subsequent conditions.
'.otai temporary disability as a result
of this accident started when he first missed
work following July 23, 1972 and continued unt;:
six months following the surgery performed by
Dr. Bauman with the exclusion of the minimal
amount of work that he returned to prior to
surgery.
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6. He relates all of his complaints as
being due to the injury sustained July 23,
1972 and indicates he was in excellent condition following his first operation and had
no problems. From a definite determinable
degree, the Panel is able to only assess 15%
body impairment to the multiple complaints
that are impossible to separate into distinct
entities because of the significant functional
impairment.
7. Mr. McPhie does have a significant
functional component to his problem at the
present time.
8.

No further surgery is indicated.

9. Psychiatric treatment would probably
be beneficial in helping him co-exist and
adapt to his environment and surroundings,
and to function better as a person, but would
not be expected to make him employable.
10. The only other medical treatment
that might be considered would be occasional
examination and follow-up by his attending
physician, Dr„ Bauman, whom he trusts. This
would be more in a manner of moral support
and emotional support, as well as symptomatic
treatment inasmuch as no specific medical
treatment, as such, is necessary.
11. The applicant indicates, at the present
time, that he is unable to engage in any types
of activity. He should be able to engage in a
wider degree of activities with further time,
elimination of the controversial matters and
supportive therapy."
The Commission adopted the Panel's report and
made, among others, the following Finding of Fact: (R. 227)
"8. Claimant has 100% permanent impairment
of his body and mind and resulting from all causes
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and conditions, including the 15% permanent
partial loss of body function attributable
to the injury sustained by Claimant in the
industrial accident of July~23, 1972. The
difference between the 15% permanent loss
of body function and the 100% permanent impairment of body and mind is attributable
to previously existing, co-existing and subsequent conditions either due to accidental
injury, disease or congenital causes, a
significant portion of which is attributable
to a functional component based upon the
absence of clinical findings to support
either the nature, severity and duration
of some of Claimant's continuing complaints.
The Commission concluded, claimant is entitled
to workmens1 compensation benefits, as provided by law,
for the multiple injuries sustained by him in the industrial accident of July 23, 1972, which accident arose
out of or was in the course of his employment with
Defendant United States Steel Corporation.
The Commission then concluded: (R, 228)
"Considering Claimant's prior history and
complaints, and considering the multiple problems
following the July 23, 1972 accident, the various
hospitalization, diagnostic efforts and cervical
surgery were not unreasonable under the circumstances. The Medical Panel concluded that much
of Claimantfs disability was attributable to
previously existing, co-existing and subsequent
conditions. They also concluded that it was
impossible to separate into distinct categories
the various aspects or components of Claimant's
permanent impairment because of the significant
functional component being involved in the
problem. Since Claimant has complex multiple
problems not susceptible of reasonable separa-
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tion or apportionment, since the problems
and complaints are consistent with the
industrial accident of July 23, 1972 and are
reasonably correlated thereto, and since
Claimant has undergone cervical surgery
August 30, 1971 and was later able to return
to his usual occupation February 15, 1972 and
continued thereunder until the industrial
accident of July 23, 1972, it should be concluded that the Defendant, United States
Steel Corporation, should be responsible
for the medical treatment of claimant following the July 23, 1972 industrial accident."
Citing Brown v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 29 U. 2d 478, 511 P.2d 743.
The Industrial Commission entered its award
which ordered, inter alia:

(R. 229)

"That Defendant shall pay claimant permanent partial disability compensation benefits
at the rate of $59.00 per week for a period
of 46.8 weeks (being 15%) which entitles
Claimant to $2,761*20 and which amount shall
be paid Claimant in a lump sum."
The Medical Panel referred to a letter dated
March 11, 1974 to Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Panel Chairman,
from Dr. E. Alan Jeppsen, M.D., College of Medicine,
University of Utah, Department of Psychiatry.

Dr.

Jeppsen stated, in answering question No. 7 from the
Industrial commission:
" Mr. McPhie does have a significant
functional component to his problem at the
present time. Mr. McPhie had a chronic
pain symdrome in 1966 following his accident.
This predisposed him to have another traumatic
neurosis develop after his recent injury to
his cervical spine. I think on top of that,
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his impaired mental functioning predisposed
him to focus on this limitation as an explanation of his poor functioning. The
accident of July 23, 1972 would have to be
considered the precipitating and aggravating event. Because of Mr. McPhie's condition
at this point, it would be difficult to work
out a treatment program for him, however, not
impossible. With the use of a behavior modification in a hospital setting, along with the
use of hypnosis, it would be possible to
relieve a certain degree of Mr. McPhie's
symptoms and to increase his functioning.
It is, however, doubtful that he would ever
be able to return to a job. I would not
recommend psychiatric treatment at this
time as this type of hospital treatment program is not yet available, but may be in the
near future." (R. 205).
A letter from Utah State Board of Education,
Division of Rehabilitation Services, May 7, 1974, to
the Commission states:
"In giving consideration to Mr. McPhie
for a rehabilitation program, it is my definite feeling that he is not medically
feasible for vocational training or job
placement. Mr. McPhie is a man advancing
in age with limited accademic or vocational
education. As various employment possibilities were mentioned these were eliminated
because of medical limitations and lack of
training. Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D., and his
orthopedic associates spelled out quite
clearly in their letter the extent of Mr.
McPhie1s injuries, and because of the poor
prognosis, I feel it would be useless to try
to attempt a vocational rehabilitation program
with a man age 58 with as many physical and
psychiatric complains and problems as this
man has. With this man's disability, I feel
that he should receive whatever compensation
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and disability benefits that he is entitled
to. I believe he would be a poor risk for
any type of employment." (R. 219).
On November 1, 1974 McPhie filed objections to
(and motion with) the Commission from the final Commission award dated October 25, 1974, and raised the
following issue:
"Based upon said Finding and Conclusion,
the award properly holds United States Steel
Corporation liable for the 15% permanent loss
of body function* The award failed to find,
conclude and hold that the Special Fund provided for in Sections 35-1-69 and 35-1-68,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, shall
be required to pay benefits on the basis of
said statutory liability and for the remaining permanent impairment which is 100%."
(R. 231-232).
Thereafter, the Commission denied that motion
and denied McPhie's Petition for Review, stating:
"As to the requirement or request of the
Claimant that an Order be entered against the
Special Injury Fund, we call the parties
attention to a parallel case decided by the
Commission on July 3, 1975 entitled L & M
O'Driscoll v. United Park City Mines and The
State Insurance Fund. It is our judgment
that the McPhie casq is very similar to the
O'Driscoll case and, having decided against
O'Driscoll, we see no reason to change
positions in the case before us # " (R. 238239).
The opinion is reproduced in the Appendix.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND

It is well established that an aggravation of
a pre-existing condition or disability may constitute
1/
a compensable injury under Utah law*
An employer is
liable for permanent total disability resulting from
2/
the last of a series of injuries where Commission findings are based on reasonable evidence that the injury
complained of is the sole cause of the disability for

2/

which the award is made.

The problem of apportionment has often caused
hardships because, while the employee may have been able
to work with a previous disability, the amount added by
an industrial accident may effectively prevent him from
working at all*

Some states have adopted apportionment
4/
statutes, Utah does not recognize apportionment.

1/

Halvorsen, Inc. v. Williams, 19 U.2d 113, 426 P.2d
1019

2/

Standard Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 69 U 83,
252 P.2d 292

3/

Ifefer's, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 526
P.2d 1088

4/

Duaine Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission
of Utah, 29 U.2d 478; citing Larson, Workmans Compensation, §95.31; Nielson v. Industrial Commission,
120 U 526, 236 P.2d 346.
11

To a s s i s t such an employee, the Utah l e g i s l a t u r e
5/
fashioned the combined injury Special Fund.
The Special
Fund i s a v a i l a b l e in c e r t a i n cases t o make payment t o
previously handicapped workers who have been i n d u s t r i a l l y
injured.

Another reason often c i t e d for the Fund was t o

encourage employers t o h i r e handicapped workers, the Fund's
existence showing the employer t h a t he would not be held
l i a b l e for an employee's e n t i r e condition in the event of
6/
a work i n j u r y .
Second injury funds have been adopted in a l l but
four states—Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada and Virginia,

V

according t o Larson, and are c i t e d as the solution t o
the dilemma of apportionment v s . non-apportionment.

_5/

§31-1-68 UCA 1953, as amended. The Fund now receives
$15,600 for each employee k i l l e d , leaving no dependents plus a tax upon insured and s e l f - i n s u r e d carriers.

6/

Larson, Workmans Compensation §59.31 n. 49
"Within 30 days following the announcement
of the non-apportionment r u l e in Nease v.
Hughes Stone Co. (244 P 778) between seven
and eight thousand, one-eyed, one-legged,
one-armed, and one-handed men were displaced
in Oklahoma # "

7/

Larson, Workmans Compensation §59.31 n. 51
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The typical second injury statute applies only
when the subsequent injury added to the prior impairment results in total permanent disability, but about
one-third of the states, including Utah, omit this
8/
limitation. California has a compromise solution requiring that the degree of final disability be at least
1/
seventy percent.
35-1-69, the section under appeal, provides:
"(1) If any employee who has previously
incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental
injury, disease, or congenital causes, sustains
an industrial injury for which compensation and
medical care is provided by this title that
results in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than he would have incurred
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity,
compensation and medical care, which medical
care and other related items are outlined in
section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis
of the combined injuries, but the liability
of the employer for such compensation and
medical care shall be for the industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid out
of the special fund provided for in section 35-1-68
(1) hereinafter referred to as the "special fund."
A medical panel having the qualifications
of the medical panel set forth in section 35-2-56,
shall review all medical aspects of the case and
determine first, the total permanent physical

8/

Larson, Workmans Compensation §59.31 n. 53

9/

California Labor Code, 14751
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impairment resulting from all causes and
conditions including the industrial injury? second, the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to
the industrial injury; and third, the percentage of permanent physical impairment
attributable to previously existing conditions whether due to accidental injury,
disease or congenital causes. The industrial commission shall then assess the
liability for compensation and medical
care to the employer on the basis of the
percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury
only and the remainder shall be payable
out of the said special fund. Amounts, if
any, which have been paid by the employer
in excess of the portion attributable to
the said industrial injury shall be reimbursed to the employer out of said special
fund.
(2) In addition the commission in
its discretion may increase the weekly
compensation rates to be paid out of such
special fund, such increase to be used for
the rehabilitation and training of any
employee coming within the provisions of
this chapter as may be certified to the
commission by the rehabilitation department of the state board of education as
being eligible for rehabilitation and
training; provided, however, that in no
case shall there be paid out of such
special fund for rehabilitation an amount in
excess of $1,000."
In 1963 an amendment rewrote this section,
which read:
"If any employee who has previously
incurred permanent partial disability
incurs a subsequent permanent partial

14

disability such that the compensation
payable for the disability resulting
from the combined injuries is greater
than the compensation which, except
for the pre-existing disability would
have been payable for the latter injury,
the employee shall receive compensation
on the basis of the combined injuries,
but the liability of his employer shall
be for the latter injury only and the
remainder shall be paid out of the
special fund provided for in subdivision
(1) of section 35-1-68? and in addition
the commission in its discretion may increase the weekly compensation rates to
be paid out of such special fund, such
increase to be used solely for the
training of any employee coming within
the provisions of this section as may
be certified to the commission by the
rehabilitation department of the state
board of education as being eligible
for training? provided, however, that in
no case shall there be paid out of such
special fund for rehabilitation an amount
in excess of $735.00."
POINT II: THE COMMISSION ERRED BY BASING ITS ORDER
ON ARBITRARY GUIDELINES, CONTRARY TO LAW
The impact of the Act seems to say:

The per-

manent disability chargeable to the special fund must
be the result of both the pre-existing condition and the
subsequent accident and must be "substantially greater"
than that which would have resulted from the accidental
injury alone.
Thus, the amount the Fund contributes would
usually be the difference between the compensation that
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would be payable for the second injury alone and the compensation payable for the combined injury.
In this case the special medical panel, authorized
by statute, established Plaintiff's physical disability
for the second injury at 15%, the remaining permanent physical impairment was attributed to previously existing, coexisting and subsequent conditions of an indeterminable
degree.

He was rated 100% totally disabled from the concept

of impairment, disability and wage loss.

Prior to his second

injury on July 23, 1972, Plaintiff had been able to work as
a locomotive engineer at the Geneva Plant, notwithstanding
his prior condition.

Following that injury he was never

able to work again.
In denying the Plaintiff benefits under the Special
Fund, the Commission ruled:
l!

„ . . t h a t the McPhie case i s very similar
t o the O'Driscoll case and having decided
a g a i n s t Mr. O'Driscoll we see no reason to
change p o s i t i o n s in the case before u s . " (R. 239)
The complete OfDriscoll opinion appears in the
Appendix to this brief.
In 0'Driscoll, the Commission had this to say:
"The Commission has for years, labored
with problems of this (35-1-69) section and,
has endeavored to interpret what constitutes
Substantially greater.1 The guidelines
of what 'substantially greater1 means
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are elusive and difficult, even among the
Commissioners, The Commission has not
formulated a written policy regarding this
matter, although in private discussions
reference has been made to a 50% and a
40% figure. Said percentages were discussed in terms of the amount of percentage
the industrial accident had to contribute
before it became "substantially greater"
within the meaning intended in the Workmen's
Compensation law. The Commission had endeavored to treat each case individually with
the idea in mind that each case would stand
on its own facts, with no particular immovable policy being set. To evaluate the
issue associated with this case, it is
imperative to return to basic principles
and endeavor to define the purpose for the
statute. We believe there are at least two
primary purposes of Section 35-1-69, Utah
Code Annotated. First, to encourage the
hiring of handicapped individuals by limiting the employer's liability to the industrial
accident only. Second, to distribute the
responsibility for pre-existing conditions
on a broader financial base. The broader base
became the combined injury fund, which is
funded by all of the insurance carriers and/
or self-insured employers.
In our judgment, the central issue of
this case is one of social philosophy. When
an industrial accident is a contributing
factor to retire a man from the labor market,
should industry pay the full impact of this
loss and at what point in the scale of 0 to 100
does the industrial accident's contribution
dictate that industry becomes responsible.
One important guideline is the fact that
Workmen's Compensation is an insurance funded
type of program, even though it is social
legislation, and some principles of insurance
should be applied in arriving at conclusions.
To arrive at some standards the State of Utah
might use, we turn to statutes of other states
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where similar problems have been reduced to
statutory designations. Section 4751 of the
California Code is as follows:
f

If an employee who is permanently
partially disabled receives a subsequent
compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial disability so
that the degree of disability caused by
the combination of both disabilities is
greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone,
and the combined effect of the last injury and the previous disability or impairment is a permanent disability equal
to 70 percent or more of total, he shall
be paid in addition to the compensation
due under this code for the permanent
partial disability caused by the last
injury compensation for the remainder
of the combined permanent disability
existing after the last injury as provided in this article; provided, that
either (a) the previous disability or
impairment affected a hand, an arm, a
foot, a leg, or an eye, and the permanent
disability resulting from the subsequent
injury affects the opposite and corresponding member, and such latter permanent
disability, when considered alone and
without regard to, or adjustment for,
the occupation or age of the employee,
is equal to 5 percent or more of total,
or, (b) the permanent disability resulting from the subsequent injury, when
considered alone and without regard to
or adjustment for the occupation or the
age of the employee, is equal to 35 percent or more of total.'
It would appear that in California when
there are combined permanent partial disabilities, the industrial accident must contribute
at least 35% or more of the total* In the
case before us, the applicant's disability
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due to the industrial accident contributes
only 15% and, therefore, would not qualify
under the California Code. Although our
statute does not specify a' fixed percentage
for qualification, we believe it reasonable
in setting our standards to look at other
statutes for guidance. It would be our
conclusion that 15% in this particular case,
does not qualify for the "substantially
greater" designation even though he is now
permanently and totally disabled*11
McPhie is a case of first impression before
this Court. The Commission's error consists in approaching the problem by applying a social philosophy test and
the formula of another state (California) which is not
relevant here.
Applying O'Driscoll, the Commission asks,

why

"should industry pay the full impact of this case" and
"at what point in the scale of 0 to 100 does the industrial accident's contribution dictate that industry becomes responsible?"

Efos the Commission forgotten that the

entire Fund has been contributed by non-dependency death
forfeitures and a tax on insurance carriers?

Apparently

so, for it seems unwilling to award any of the fund created
by a tax on industry.

The Commission, anxious to pre-

serve the Fund, is saying that the McPhies and the O'Driscolls had better be cared for by welfare or public charity.
Commission's social philosophy rationale has no place here.
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Secondly, the Commission conjures up the California statute as a guide, to arrive at a formula that
industrial accident must contribute at least 35% or
more of the total.

It holds:

"It would be our con-

clusion that 15% in this particular case (O'Driscoll),
does not qualify for the 'substantially greater1 designation even though he is now permanently and totally
disabled."
The Fund should be liable when the degree of
disability was made substantially greater by the combination of both injuries.

Professor Larson cites several

cases illustrating how some industrial commissions have
10/
applied the subtrahend calculations.

10/ Special Indemnity Fund v. Simpson, 349 P.2d 635;
Columbia Coal Co. v. Griffie, 425 S.W.2d 759? Reliance Ins. Co. v. Watts, 293 A.2d 836? Special
Indemnity Fund v. Wilbanks, 340 P.2d 469 (reversed
on other grounds)? Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Ind.
Ace. Comm'n, 348 P.2d 193 (a pre-existing psychiatric condition sufficient)? Balash v. Harper, 70
A.2d 747? Davis v. Conger Life Ins. Co., 201 So.2d
727? Spencer v. Ind. Comm'n, 87 U 336, 40 P.2d 188
("The fact that a man has once received compensation as for 50% of total disability does not
mean that ever after he is, in the eyes of compensation law, but half a man, so that he can never
again receive a compensation award going beyond
the other 50% of the total").
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If the Commission is sustained here, every
worker with greater than 50% prior disability should
be disqualified for any subsequent injury of 49% or
less, since the second injury cannot be substantially
greater arithmatically.
the statute inoperative.

Such arbitrary criteria makes
Plaintiff's counsel is not

aware of a Utah Industrial Commission decision granting any worker Special Fund benefits. The Commission's
concern over the Fund's solvency is notable but should not
be the basis for this denial.
Here a 58 year old worker is relegated to the
dump heap because of injuries received in employment in
1966 and 1972, when combined with other personal physical conditions.

He is tagged as 100% totally and per-

manently disabled, given a magnanimous award of 15%,
and is told that is all. He is disqualified for lifetime benefits because 15% is not substantially greater
than 85%. This seems to be moving the Special, Fund in
reverse of the direction the legislature intended, and
what common sense dictates.

Is it reasonable to hold

United States Steel liable for only 15% of the disability, and decree that the remaining 85% is exempt
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from any coverage under an industrially funded program?

Should public welfare take on this assignment

also?
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the Order of the Commission and remand with instructions to find the Plaintiff qualified to receive benefits under the Special
Injury Fund.

The Court should further order the

Commission to bear the Plaintiff's costs and attorney's
fees in the interest of justice.
Respectfully submitted,

A. WALLY SSSNDACK
SANDACK & SANDACK
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
370 E a s t F i f t h S o u t h
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h
84111
Telephone:
(801) 5 3 1 - 0 5 5 5
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
File No. 1U653--1133
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A Supplemental Order was entered in the above
entitled case by a Hearing Examiner of the Commission on
February 5, 1975, wherein he affirmed an Order of the
Commission dated January 2 2 , 1973/ Subsequent to the
Commission's Order of January 2 2 , 1973, the case was
appealed to the Supreme Court and later withdrawn.
The
withdrawal of the appeal was to further evaluate the case
and to have the applicant examined by an Occupational D i s ease Panel to determine the extent of the applicant's disability for an occupational disease. The applicant was
examined and found by the Panel to be one hundred (100%)
percent disabled, but not due to an occupational disease.
The Medical Panel for occupational disease found that he
had no industrial lung disease, and no primary pulmonary
disease.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated, the case was then referred to the entire Commission
for review. The Commission has reviewed the case and
sat in banc to discuss the issues with counsel for the
applicant. After review of the issues involved, we are
of the opinion that the Motion for Review should be denied .
'
The applicant's position is that he is 100%
permanently and totally disabled, and that he received a
permanent partial disability as a result of the industrial
accident, amounting to 15%, and this 15% combining with
the other infirmities and disabilities h$ has entitles
him to lifetime benefits under the provisions of Section
35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated.
Said provision allows for
benefits from the combined injury fund if the injuries
sustained by the industrial accident is substantially
greater than he would have had, if he had not had the
preexisting condition. The Commission has for years,
labored with the problems of this section, and, has endeavored to interpret what constitutes "substantially
greater.fI T h e g u i d e l i n e s o f w h a t H c t l Ko+-~~ •»--.•--»-» -
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written policy regarding this matter, although in private
discussions reference has been made to a 50% and a 40%
figure.
Said percentages were discussed in terms of the
amount of percentage the industrial accident had to contribute before it became "substantially greater" within
the meaning intended in the Workmen's Compensation law.
The Commission has endeavored to treat each case individually with the idea in mind that each case would stand
on its own facts, with no particular immovable policy being
set*
To evaluate the issue associated with this case, it
is imperative to return to basic principles and endeavor
to define the purpose for the statute. We believe there
are at least two primary purposes of Section 35-1-69, Utah
Code Annotated.
First, to encourage the hiring of handicapped individuals by limiting the employer's liability
to the industrial accident only. Second, to distribute
the responsibility for preexisting conditions on a broader
financial base. The broader base became the combined injury fund, which is funded by all of the insurance carriers
and/or self-insured employers.
In our judgement, the central issue in this case
is one of social philosophy. When an industrial accident
is a contributing factor to retire a man from the labor
market, should industry pay the full impact of this loss
and at what point in the scale of 0 to 100 does the industrial accident's contribution dictate that industry b e comes responsible. One important guideline is the fact
that Workmen's Compensation is an insurance funded type
of program, even though it is social legislation, and
some principles of insurance should be applied in arriving
at conclusions. To arrive at some standards the State of
Utah might use, we turn to statutes of other states where
similar problems have been reduced to statutory designations.
Section 4751 of the California Code is as
follows:
"If an employee who is permanently partially
disabled receives a subsequent compensable injury
resulting in additional permanent partial disability so that the degree of disability caused by
the combination of both disabilities is greater
than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone, and the combined effect of
the last injury and the previous disability or
impairment is a permanent disability equal to 70
percent or more of total, he shall be paid in
addition to t.he compensation due under this code
for the permanent partial disability caused by the
last injury compensation for the remainder of the
combined permanent disability existing after the
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that either (a) the previous disability or impairment affected a hand, an arm, a foot, a leg, or an
eye, and the permanent disability resulting from
the subsequent injury affects the opposite and
corresponding member, and such latter permanent
disability, when considered alone and without regard to, or adjustment for, the occupation or age
of the employee, is equal to 5 percent or more of
total, or (b) the permanent disability resulting
from the subsequent injury, when considered alone
and without regard to or adjustment for the occupation or the age of the employee, is equal to
35 percent or more of total."
It would appear that in California when there are
combined permanent partial disabilities, the industrial
accident must contribute at least 35% or more of the total.
In the case before us, the applicant's disability due to
the industrial accident contributes only 15% and, therefore,
would not qualify under the California Code. Although our
statute does not specify a fixed percentage for qualification, we believe it reasonable in setting our standards
to look at other statutes for guidance. It would be our
conclusion that 15% in this particular case, does not
qualify for the "substantially greater" designation even
though he is now permanently and totally disabled.
Applicant also contends the award of the Commission
dated January 2 2 , 1973 and the Order of the Hearing Examiner dated February 5, 1975, improperly computes the
15% disability.
With this contention we agree. The
Award should be based on 15% of 312 weeks or 46.8 weeks
at $51.20 per week.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the paragraph of
the Commission's Order dated January 2 2 , 1973 pertaining
to permanent partial disability in the amount of $1,536.00
shall be, and is hereby, amended to delete the $1,536.00
figure to require defendants pay the sum of $2,396.16 in
lieu thereof.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Review
filed by the applicant in all other respects shall be, and
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is hereby, denied and the prior Order and Supplemental
Order of the Commission shall in all other respects be,
and is hereby, affirmed.
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Passed byr/the Industrial Commission of Utah, Salt Lake City,
this -r^yf^*' day of July, 1975.
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'Gloria E. Hann.i, Commission Secretary
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